I am a professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Toronto. My research is centred on the theory of reference, singular thought, and associated topics in the philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, the philosophy of action, and metaphysics.

IMOGEN DICKIE. Home CV Publications Teaching Other Fixing Reference (OUP, 2015) This book develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this part of meta-semantics tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist ...

Here are the graduate classes I’ve taught, with descriptions of the more recent ones. Spring 2022 – Foundations of Expressivism (cotaught with Nate Charlow) This is coming up…. Spring 2021 – New Books in the Philosophy of Language (cotaught with Phil Kremer) We worked through Mark Richard Meanings as Species; Robbie Williams The Metaphysics of Representation; and Stephen Yablo Aboutness.

IMOGEN DICKIE. Home CV Publications Teaching Other cv_for_web.pdf: File Size: 121 kb: File Type: pdf: Download File. Powered by Create your own unique website with customizable templates. Get Started. Home CV Publications Teaching Other IMOGEN DICKIE. Home CV Publications Teaching ...

Imogen Dickie This paper proposes an account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is intended as a successor to the view that Gareth Evans proposed in ‘The Causal Theory of Names’ and revised in The Varieties of Reference1. Evans argued that the bearer of a proper

IMOGEN DICKIE. Home CV Publications Teaching Other In April 2017 I wrote six blog posts on *Fixing Reference* for *The Brains Blog*. They're intended to state some of the main ideas and arguments of the book in 'read it on your phone on your way home' format. Archived here ...

Imogen Dickie DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0008 Abstract and Keywords To be ‘acquainted’ with a thing is to be in a position to think about it in virtue of a perceptual link, and …

Imogen Dickie and Gurpreet Rattan, University of Toronto This paper is about the relation between a singular term’s cognitive significance and the requirements on using the term to communicate. A term’s ‘cognitive significance’ is the part of its meaning that determines its role in a speaker’s rational cognitive life.

Imogen Dickie © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2.

thought. These perceptual links are too indirect to put S in a position to think about o in the same way as the perceptual link at (1) does (they enable S to think about o, but only under the descriptions ‘the maker of this footprint’ or ‘the driver of that car’).